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CHAPTER I
I. An Introductory Survey of Profit Sharing
A. Definition of Profit Sharing and Scope of the Study
For the purposes of this study profit sharing is defined as
payments in the form of cash, given under a predetermined and continu-
ing policy by the management of a company to all, or any group, of its
officers or employees in addition to their established wages or salaries.
Specifically excluded are such forms of extra wage or salary compensa-
tion as royalties or other payments based directly upon the adoption
of specific inventions or suggestions, sales commissions, individual
bonuses based solely on measured production or reduction in operating
cost, attendance and Christmas bonuses, payments on insurance or to
retirement or other benefit or savings plans not based directly on pro-
fits, and payments under any individual contract for the employment of
a specified person at compensation determined in whole or in part by
volume or profit.
In a resolution passed by the International Congress on Profit
Sharing in Paris in 1889, profit sharing was defined as a system
"whereby, according to an arrangement voluntarily made by the manage-
ment, a number of employees in a business enterprise receive in addition
to their regular wages a definite, previously determined part of the net
profits." 1 To be more specific, a pure profit-sharing plan is inclusive
of the following factors:
1. The amount to be distributed among participants depends
1 Daugherty, Carroll R.
,
Labor Problems in American Industry
,
Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co.
,
1941. p. 623.
.
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4principally on earnings.
2. The proportion to be distributed is definitely determined
in advance.
3. The benefits of the plan are extended to at least one-third
of the ordinary wage-earning or salary-earning employees.
Profits are defined as the actual net balance or gain realized
from the operations of the undertaking in relation to which the scheme
exists, and the sums paid to the employees out of the profits are to be
directly dependent upon the profits.
This study is an attempt to survey the field of profit sharing,
with emphasis on plans in operation since 1920, and to arrive at a con-
clusion as to the desirability of profit sharing under existing condi-
tions, from the viewpoint of the employer.
B. The Development and History of Profit Sharing in America 1
The history of profit sharing extends over a century and a
quarter, and in that time the total number of plans established is
about 1,000 or 1,200. In the United States profit sharing was fostered
entirely by employers. The first known systematic plan of profit sharing
in the United States was inaugurated in 1794 by Albert Gallatin in his
glass works in Pennsylvania, on the grounds that "the democratic principle
upon which this Nation was founded should not be restricted to the
political processes, but should be applied to industry." 2
^T];is material was derived principally from: United States Senate,
Survey of Experiences in Profit Sharing and Possibilities of Incen-
tive Taxation; Hearings before a Subcommittee' of~ the Committee on
Finance.
. , Pursuant to S. Res, 215 . . .
,
Washington, 1939. pp.7-8
2Ibid . t p.6.
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Although Gallatin T s plan was the first established in America, in France
a profit-sharing plan was introduced in 1842 by Leclaire, who is known
as the "Father of Profit Sharing." The French plans which followed were
an expression of the social reform movement which followed the Napoleoni
wars,
Horace Greeleyhad a profit-sharing plan in the New York Trib-
une and was an advocate of its mutual benefits. In 1869, Brewster &
Company ,carriage builders of New York, established a plan of profit-
sharing which was terminated by a strike in 1871. Pillsbury Flour Mills
of Minneapolis, Minnesota, established a plan in 1882. In 1886 the N. 0
Nelson Company, of St. Louis, initiated direct profit sharing in the Com
pany, which continued with success until it was abandoned during the re-
cent depression. In 1884 the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company inaugu-
rated a "pension relief-savings" plan which operated until 1938. The
Procter & Gamble plan, established in 1886 as a profit-sharing and gen-
eral employee relations program, still continues in a modified form.
The Ballard Sc Ballard Company, Louisville, also set up a plan in that
year but terminated it in 1918.
Other prominent companies which have adopted profit-sharing
plans are the Simplex Wire Sc Cable Company, of Cambridge, Massachusetts,
in 1901; Hibbard, Spencer, Bartlett & Company, of Chicago, in 1902; the
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and the
Eastman Kodak Company, in 1912; the Edison Electric Illuminating Com-
pany, of Boston, in 1913; the California Sc Hawaiian Sugar Company,
Crockett, California, in 1914; and the Cleveland Twist Drill Company,
Cleveland, in 1915. These plans were still in existence in 1939.
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6In 1916, Sears, Roebuck & Company, of Chicago, initiated a
plan under which the company distributes five percent of its net prof-
its. This plan is still in operation. In 1918 the Joslyn Manufactur-
ing & Supply Company of Chicago adopted a "profit-3haring-3aving-re-
tirement fund.” In 1919 the Ehdicott-Johnson Shoe Company ,Endicott,
New York, inaugurated a broad employee relations plan of profit-shar-
ing including a medical and hospitalization program. From 1920 to
1947 the General Electric Company of Schenectady, New York, operated a
plan of profit-sharing coupled with savings. This plan will be discuss-
ed later under "Discontinued Plans." The Westinghouse Electric and
Manufacturing Company of Pittsburg instituted a plan in 1936. Fair-
banks Morse and Company of Chicago adopted profit sharing in 1937.
During the period of World War 1 and immediately following the
war, when profits mounted, about five times as many plans were initiated
as in the preceding decade, when bills for compulsory profit sharing
were introduced into the Massachusetts legislature in 1903 and 1904,
but were defeated.
In 1917 the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics found
sixty plans of profit-sharing in operation in the country, under which
distributions of specified proportions of net profits were made to at
least one-third of a company’s personnel. Under a much larger number
of plans profits were shared with a few important employees only. 2
A study made in 1920 reported on ninety-seven active plans, which were
1 Aneurin Williams, Copartnership and Profit Sharing
,
New York: Henry
Holt and Co., 1913. p. 227.
2 Boris Emmet, Profit Sharing in the United States
,
Washington, 1917,
(United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin No. 208.)
<
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7distributed as follows: true profit sharing, forty-one; limited profit
sharing, fourteen; wage bonus plans, thirty; and savings sharing plans,
twelve. 1 In the same year the National Civic Federation, which inter-
preted the term profit sharing quite broadly, described 214 American
plans of profit sharing, grouped as: percentage plans, forty-six; special
distributions, 143; exceptional plans, twenty-five. 2 Balderston’s
study found thirty-three plans had been initiated in the period 1931-1936.
A study made in January, 1945, by Stewart and Couper, recorded eighty-
nine plans which had been established since then.
The Bureau of Revenue has recently issued an analysis of the
number of profit-sharing plans approved by it up to August 31, 1946. In
all, 2,508 plans were processed covering 332,589 employees. 3
In terms of the movement as a whole, the proportion of discon-
tinued plans is high. Of the 193 plans known to have existed in the
United States up to 1936, it is estimated that about 60 percent had been
discontinued by that time. 4 In the decade that followed World War 1,
special plans of profit sharing for executives designed as financial
incentives began to be more widely adopted by American corporations.
This shift from profit sharing for all employees to managerial profit
sharing had been under way for some time; in 1917 profit-sharing plans
1 National Industrial Conference Board, Practical Experience with Pro-
fit Sharing in Industrial Establishments
,
Boston, 1920 (Research
Report No. 29) p. 81.
2 National Civic Federation—Profit Sharing Department, Profit Sharing
by American Employers
,
2d ed., New York, 1920, pp. 24-187, 266-303.
3 Notes and Quotes . Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., December 1947.
4 C.C. Balderston, Profit Sharing for Wage Burners
,
New York: Industrial
Relations Counselors, Inc., 1937, p. 28.
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for executives greatly exceeded in number those that benefited employees
in the lower ranks. 1 The spread of profit sharing and stock bonuses for
executives, with the increases in the total executive compensation of
many corporations, was also an expression of a change in industrial
management in the Unit9d States. Corporations had become more predominant
ly professionally managed than owner-managed. After the Securities and
Exchange Commission regulations evoked publicity on executive compensation
trade unions were quick to support demands for higher wages by reference
to the liberal salaries and bonuses paid to top executives.
In recent years, and especially during World War II, profit
sharing has encountered new difficulties by reason of enforced disclo-
sure of executive compensations, the government’s wage and salary stabi-
lization policy, higher personal income taxes, which have the tffect of
depriving the profit sharer of part of his bonus, and the uncertainty of
the attitude of the courts. These factors in part account for the trend
to trusteed profit-sharing plans under which the shares of profits are
set aside in trust for the future benefit of employees — a device that
reduces corporate taxes, since such appropriations are deductible as
operating expenses for tax purposes. It also avoids charges of dis-
crimination in favor of executives.
Yet, with all the difficulties, there has been a distinct
movement toward pension and profit-sharing plans. We see this trend in
the following quotation from an article by Mr. Norman D. Cann:
By March 31, 1945, over 7,500 plans had been submitted
to the Bureau of Internal Revenue for advance ruling
as to their qualification under Section 165 (a).
1 Boris Emmet, Profit Sharing in the United States, op. cit .
,
p. 11.
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There are now probably more than five times as
many plans in existence as there were prior to
our entry into the war, more than ten times the
number there were prior to the outbreak of the
European war in 1939, and about twenty times the
number in existence prior to the enactment of the
Social Security Act less than ten years ago. *
The rapid advance in wage rates in the past two years has
given employees a larger "take home" pay than they formerly received in
earnings and shares in profits. If wage rates remain at present levels
some employers feel that it will not be fair to the stockholders to
maintain any form of extra compensation in supplement to wages.
C. Some Studies of Profit Sharing
The number of American profit-sharing studies is out of pro-
portion to the almost insignificant position the movement has attained
in industry. They evolved from an uncritical acceptance of profit shar
ing as a moral duty of employers to a more objective and analytical
approach.
The earlier writers favored profit sharing on the ground that
industrial strife was caused mainly by conflict between employers and
employees about the division of a company’s income among shareholders,
management and wage earners. These writers believed that the wage sys-
tem was too rigid. They advocated that wages should be moderate and
stable and that management should adopt profit-sharing plans so that
total profits would be increased through such incentive systems.
At the turn of the century the students of profit sharing
1 Quoted in C. Morton Winslow
,
Profit Sharing and Pension Plans
,
New York: Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1946. pp„ 9-10.
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only after a well rounded, adequately financed program of employee
security has been developed and that, if entered upon, profit sharing
should be used to further employee security.
In 1939 the Senate Committee on Finance made an effort to
promote profit sharing. They realized that the profit system is essen-
tial to the existence of a competitive capitalistic society, and that
profit sharing is one method of distributing the benefits of the profit
system over a larger number of citizens. They made a study of existing
profit-sharing plans with a special view to making the report available
to employers who wished to establish such plans, and to advise the
Federal Government of what means it could encourage the establishment of
these plans.
The third study, made by B. M. Stewart and W. J. Couper for
Industrial Relations Counselors in 1945, came to somewhat similar con-
clusions as those of Balderston. They found that profit sharing could
be introduced to good advantage only in a comparatively few companies,
and then it should be adopted to crown a good personnel program in which
management has already discharged its primary obligations. The plan
should be designed to further long-range security.
A study of executive compensation by G. T. Washington appeared
in 1942, and contained material on profit sharing. Governmental and
court restraints were explored. The social obligations of management
were emphasized. The conclusion reached was that there must be stand-
ards of self-denial as well as efficient performance for executives.
Two volumes on profit sharing and pension plans by K.R. Clark
and C.M. Winslow were published in 1946. They present a practical analysis
_*
.
t
c
.
.
.
.
.
.
. I
.
«
-
-
. .
J" .
10
became more critical in their attitude. They realized that some employ-
ers used profit sharing as a device to discourage organized labor; and
that in some companies profit sharing could not increase total profits
through work by the employees, that poor management was responsible for
low profits, as were adverse conditions. These writers did agree that
a few progressive employers with an intelligent group of employees and
profitable enterprises might meet success with such plans.
Studies of the 20's considered profit sharing for the executive.
They found that there was greater effectiveness in profit-sharing plans
for the executive than in those for the rank and file. During the de-
pression, profit sharing for executives began to be questioned. While
total executive compensation declined during the depression, it was shown
to have been more stable than wages or dividends. ^ Some profit sharing
plans for executives led to serious abuses. Other criticisms were that
the proportions of profits resulting from the efforts of executives would
not readily be determined, that their compensation would be very irregular,
and finally, that such factors as publicity, higher taxes, and the public
attitude, were drawbacks from the executive viewpoint.
Since the depression three significant studies of profit shar-
ing have been made. The study made by C.C. Balderston, Dean of the
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, in
1937 emphasized that profit sharing is not a fundamental personnel device,
that its value as an incentive is doubtful, that it should be established
1 National Industrial Conference Board, The Economic Almanac for 1946-
1947
,
New York, 1946, pp. 53, 104.
t. ...
of planning and administration and of the effect of law and taxes on
the plans. These books are particularly helpful in the actual forma-
tion and installation of profit-sharing plans.
-'
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CHAPTER II
II. Characteristics of Profit Sharing Plans
A. A Description of Profit Sharing
Any complete study of profit-sharing systems must include all
employee-benefit plans to which the employer contributes any sums, or be-
cause of which the employer incurs any1 expenses which in the final analy-
sis must of necessity be paid from profits. The Sears, Roebuck plan of
profit-sharing is an example of the broader definition of profit sharing.
The Company voluntarily established a plan by which employees receive a
predetermined share of the profits. Five percent of the net profits of
the company before taxes is set aside in a fund to be accumulated for
the purpose of providing retirement benefits upon separation from the
service of the company, the cost being charged as an operating expense.
Balderston, in Profit Sharing for Wage Earners
,
has designated
two types of plans. The first is profit sharing and ownership by employ-
ees of at least a majority of common stock. His second type of plan is
predetermined profit sharing, under which a part of employee remuneration
depends upon company profits and is determined according to a formula
announced in advance.
Burritt, in his book, mentions three different types of profit-
sharing plans. First is the general profit sharing type, in vhich there
is a distribution of a portion of the profits of the business as a whole.
The second type is unit profit sharing, in which there is distribution of
a portion of the profits of a part or separate unit of the business. The
third type of plan is individual profit sharing, in which the profits to
be divided may be those attributed to an individual’s own efforts. "The

essential feature of profit sharing is that the employees’ earnings are
not definitely fixed, and that the basis upon which they vary is net
profits.” -1-
In spite of the experience in profit sharing, or perhaps be-
cause of this experience, the plans present no dominant pattern. Almost
every possible combination of characteristics can be found. The differ-
ence in plans is most fundamental according to their coverage. That is,
they vary as to whether they are designed to benefit substantially all
employees or to apply only to a limited group of senior officials. The
next most basic difference is between plans under which shares in pro-
fits are distributed currently and those under which such shares go into
a fund for later distribution on specified conditions. The former type
are called "non-trustee d" ; the latter, "trusteed." The term "predeter-
mined" designates plans in which the total amount of profits allocated
for distribution is determined on the basis of a definite pre-established
formula, while "arbitrary" refers to those plans under which such amounts
are determined from time to time at the discretion of the management.
"Fixed formula" and "discretionary" differentiate plans in which each
participant’s share is based automatically on a formula from those in
which the individual share is left to the discretion of management.
B. Objectives of Profit Sharing
In setting up profit-sharing plans managements have held var-
ious objectives. One of the most common reasons advanced by companies
J Burritt, A. W.
,
et al., Profit Sharing, Its Principles and Practice,
New York: Harper and Bros., 1929. p. 5.
tJ
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is that the plan might provide some type of retirement income for
employees. The security of jobs and earnings is enhanced by protecting
employees and their families through a savings plan against unemployment,
disability, old age, and death. Other plans were started in the hope
that they would arouse the participants to greater effort or would act
as an incentive in other ways. However, profit sharing with the rank
and file employees is not strong enough to be e financial incentive. It
is only an indirect stimulus to increased effort, since profits depend
on the entire working force, management, and business conditions.
Another purpose has been to reward employees for exceptional
service. The most important application in this instance is for gang
work incentive and incentive in unstandardized industries. Profit sharing
is adaptable as a reward when close supervision is impossible, or for those
occupying discretionary or managerial positions.
Profit sharing is, in many cases, motivated by the objective of
reducing labor costs and providing a measure of protection to employees
against risks of industry. As a method of promoting industrial peace,
profit sharing is not often effective, although it has been used as an
attempt to eliminate unrest and strikes. Profit sharing or any one of
several bonus plans may prove helpful in securing stability of the labor
supply. Its greatest importance is not in encouraging savings and econo-
mies, except where it is applied to those in managerial positions to cut
costs.
Many times profit sharing is installed to promote effective
management, as it stimulates employees in this group to exercise their
foresight, resourcefulness and initiative. It is not wise to rely simply
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on the use of profit shading to insure continuance of effective manage-
ment. Lien must be selected with a view to their ability, although trans'
fer of responsibility to them can be made more confidently if arrange-
ment is made whereby they are to participate in profits. A prime essen-
tial for the success of any of the plans is a proper selection, training
and promotion policy. Its effectiveness as an inducement to efficiency
is greater among small groups, and it is an appropriate method of com-
pensating those in managerial positions.
Profit sharing for humanitarian purposes is usually unaccept-
able unless it is on a firm business basis and pays its own way.
If an employer pays salaries and profit sharing
allowances, or pensions in any form, totalling more
than the value of the service he receives, he must
charge more for the product he makes than it is xwrth,
in order to avoid a deficit, and then he cannot meet
competition. It seems evident that an employer is
not going to adopt either a pension plan or a profit-
sharing plan unless he knows that his business is
going to benefit thereby. A profit-sharing plan or
a pension plan must pay its way to justify its oper-
ation. 1
Fundamentally, its purpose . . . (is to offer) greater
reward for greater effort and successful business re-
sults. 2
C. Basis of Determining the Proportion of Profits for Distribution
The amount of profits to be distributed to employees may be
arrived at either on a (l) Predetermined basis, usually in terms of a
percentage of net earnings after specified deductions, or (2) by arbi-
1 George B. Buck, "Are Profit Sharing Plans a Substitute for Pensions?"
The Journal of Commerce. (May 29, 1946, Reprint)
L Idem.
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trary decision of the management each year. There seems to be consider-
able agreement as to the desirability of incorporating in the plan the
specific teims by which the amount of money available for distribution
is to be determined. There is a slight tendency to allow management
more freedom of action in deciding the total amount of profits to be
distributed to the executive group than in those plans Covering all
employees.
When plan3 are examined by period of initiation, it is seen
that in all periods the majority of plans incorporated the predetermined
basis. In the decade 1925 to 1934, the arbitrary basis was particularly
unpopular, but with the marked increase in the number of plans established,
especially for executives, between 1935 and 1940, a period of rising pros-
perity, there was an increase in the use of this method of allocating
funds. However, since 1940 the plans installed have distributed profits
on a predetermined basis. In many of the predetermined plans a degree
of flexibility is provided by allowing the board of directors to alter
the formula if such action is desirable.
Companies have employed two general methods of handling the
profit-sharing funds after they have been allocated. Some managements
place the available funds in trust for the future benefit of the parti-
cipants. The non-trusteed type of plan provides for distributing the
profit-sharing funds immediately or within a specified time, usually
not more than a year.
Burritt, and his collaborators, in their chapter, "Liethods
of Providing for the Proportion or Amount of Profits to be Distributed,”
has outlined five methods of distribution which must depend on the pur-
<.
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pose of the plan.
1. Distribution of profits prior to the deduction of interest
on the investment.
2. Distribution of profits after such deduction.
3. Distribution of profits prior to the deduction of dividends
of stock.
4. Distribution of profits after such deduction.
5. Distribution of profits varying with the individual rate.
The authors are in favor of the first mentioned method of distribution. *-
The amount of profits for distribution usually takes three
forms. That is, stock, cash, or contributions to a fund to be utilized
for social purposes. Their stock, whether or not of the preferred type,
may be paid for, in whole or part, from their share of profits accrued
or future. It may be necessary to restrict the amount and transfer of
stock of the ^employees. If the stock is specially issued provision
should be made for it to be transferred to the company upon withdrawal
of the employee. Most employees, however, prefer to purchase common
stock to attain voting privileges and to share more directly in profits.
Professor Carroll R. Daugherty has outlined the basis on which
profits should be divided. He believes that the partition should come
out of net income, and the proportion for distribution should be from
about five to fifty percent. He gives four forms in which payments may
be made. The first, is a cash payment at the end of the fiscal year or
^ Burritt, et. al., Profit Sharing, Its Principles and Practice, op. cit.
,
p. 1S8.
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at stated shorter intervals. The second form is a deferred payment
plan in which each employee’s share is placed by the management in a sav-
ings fund or superannuation account bearing from three to six percent
interest. The third form of the distribution is giving the men company
stock instead of money or an account. The fourth form mentioned is under
loss and profit sharing. Daugherty writes that in this latter form, ten
percent should be deducted from weekly wages for a loss reserve. If a
loss is sustained, each employee’s share is deducted from the fund. If
no loss, but a profit is maintained, each participating worker gets back
his reserve contribution and, after a six percent capital stock payment,
his share in the remaining profits. 1
A variation of profit sharing has been announced by Sargent
& Greenleaf Company, Rochester, New York. In their plan the employees
share monthly in the distribution of ten percent of the net profits
before state and federal 'taxes. In accepting the new plan workers agreed
on the elimination of the incentive program previously in effect. 2
Provisions for a unique profit-sharing plan—unique because
the union balances it with an agreement to approve wage reductions in
bad years—have been written into a new contract between the South At-
lantic Gas Company and the International Union of Operating Engineers
(AFL) which has in its membership operating employees of the company in
Savannah, Ga., Orlando and St. Augustine, Fla. 3
1 Daugherty, Carroll R.
,
Labor Problems in American Industry
,
Boston:
p
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1941. pp. 624-625.
" Notes and Quotes . Connecticut General Life Insurance Co., (August,
1946)
.
3 Notes and Quotes. Idem.

The president of the Gruen Watch Company, Cincinnati, has an-
nounced another type of profit-sharing plan. Each employee has been
allocated fifteen percent of a year’s pay under the company's profit-
sharing plan. Every year, Gruen sets aside a percentage of its profits
to be held in trust for ten years. Thereafter each employee withdraws
annually a tenth of the amount accumulated to his account, or if he leaves
he may withdraw the whole amount.
D. Basis of Apportionment of Profits to Employees.
The share of the total amount allocated for distribution
which is received by the individual may be determined in any one of three
ways. It may be entirely discretionary with management, it may be deter-
mined by application of a fixed formula related to an employee’s earnings
or the formula may reflect his savings, usually in the form of contribu-
tion to a profit-sharing or retirement fund. The discretionary method
is not found in any of the plans applying to all employees under which
the total amount allocated for distribution is determined on an arbitrary
basis*
t
Distribution in proportion to earnings is the dominant charac-
teristic of non-trusteed plans for all employees and is widely accepted
among trusteed plans regardless of the basis for determining the amount
allocated for distribution. Distribution on the basis of earnings is not
as common in the plans limited to executives as is discretionary distri-
bution. Many of the plans specify that employees must contribute a fixed
1 Ibid
.
(July 1946)
t. .
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percentage of their earnings but also allow them to contribute addition-
al amounts up to a fixed maximum percentage of their salaries.
The apportionment among individual participants of the total
amount of profits available for them, at the managements discretion,
is not ordinarily to be recommended. Not only the basis of participation
for the group, but also for the individuals, should be definitely pre-
determined. If a plan includes employees whose earnings are widely
divergent, it will frequently be advisable to classify them. It may be
that the higher paid employees will require special inducement—absolute-
ly and relatively larger. Therefore, different plans should be arranged
for different groups of employees. As a rule distribution of profits
among members of a group in proportion to wages, salary, or earnings,
will prove more effective than a per capita or equal distribution.
A definite statement or agreement should be made by the em-
ployer. It must be simple in form and anticipate the contingencies which
might arise; the frequency of distributions should be adapted to the
character of the participating group; and provision for publicity of
earnings should be made to the extent necessary to maintain the confi-
dence of the participants. The participants must be assured that they
are receiving the full amount of profits to which they are entitled
under the provisions of the plan.
An important factor in attaining the objectives of a particular
plan is the choice of the groups that are to be permitted to participate
in the profit distribution. Prior to 1925, relatively more of the plans
established tended to embrace all employees, but from 1925 to 1939 the
tendency was toward executive participation only. Since 1940 there has
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been a marked tendency toward the establishment of plans in which again
all employees could participate.
although plans may be described for convenience as covering
all or only special classes of employees, eligibility requirements fre-
quently place further restrictions on participation. In plans for the
executive, managerial or office groups, length of service is seldom a
requirement for participation, but in those having such a provision
the period of service is longer for the limited group than for all em-
ployees.
In both the trusteed and non-trusteed plans the specified per-
iod of service may be anywhere from four weeks to five years, although it
is usually in the range of six months to a year. Occasionally employees with
less than minimum service get one-half the regular bonus or a small speci-
fied sum and allowance is sometimes made for time lost through illness.
Some plans exclude certain employees: those below a specified age; those
working wholly or partly on commission; those earning more than a speci-
fied wage or salary for the period; and sometimes members of trade unions.
Occasionally provisions are made to exclude employees if they are guilty
of unsatisfactory conduct, waste of materials, negligence of machinery and
equipment, irregularity in employment or absence without sufficient cause,
inefficiency, or breach of discipline.
The active trusteed plans provide for payment to an employee
of part or all of the money held to his credit when he leaves the company’s
service, under certain conditions, such as retirement, disability or death.
Limitations on the amount received are generally applied when an individu-
al’s employment is terminated for other causes, such as permanent layoff
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or resignation. In no case do employees lose their own contributions.
In some cases the amount forfeited is distributed among the remaining
participants; in others, such amounts revert to the company.
Employees are afforded protection against losses by the pro-
visions in the investment of funds that are found in the trusteed plans.
Some plans limit to a small percentage the funds that may be invested in
company stock, although others allow the trustees complete discretion.
In a few cases, plans stipulate that employee contributions only must not
be invested in company stock. In some cases the Securities Act of 1933
governs the investment of profit-sharing funds.
Although many advocates of profit sharing have urged that
shares of profit be distributed to employees in stock of the company
or invested by the trustee in company stock, this procedure has not
been widely adopted as full -disclosure must be made to the Securities
and Exchange Commission of the reasons for such arrangements and of
the conditions under which such investments are made. There is a tend-
ency to incorporate stock ownership features in profit-sharing plans
during periods of rising prosperity, such as 1920 to 1924, and 1935 to
1944. In the 1920 to 1924 period twenty-nine percent of the plans in-
volving stock ownership were for higher ranking employees, while in the
1935 to 1939 period sixty percent of the plans covered the executive
group as compared with thirty-five percent in the 1940 to 1944 period. 1
Stewart, Bryce M. and Couper, Walter J., Profit Sharing and Stock Own-
ership for Wage Earners and Executives, Industrial Relations Counselors,
Inc., New York, 1945, pp. 29 and 32.

CHAPTER III
III. Administration and Experience
A. Administration 1
The greatest majority of plans are administered by the company
board of directors or other management representatives, such as the per-
sonnel or industrial relations managers. Only a fev; of the plans allow
employee representatives to aid in administration.
However, a plan of profit-sharing in which the process of instal-
lation and operation brings the employees in an organized way into a
sharing of the administration can become fundamentally educational.
Joint cooperative action can help both to minimize any sense of arbitrary
philanthropy and to maximize the beneficent effects on the employees*
attitude toward the company. The wise place to start with profit-shar-
ing is with joint determination of amounts of work and related amounts
of pay. The start should be made with problems surrounding the conduct
and improvement of each job; and the attempt should be to build the
worker’s interest, knowledge, sense of responsibility, and reward up
from the place, the outlook, and the reward which he now has.
In this process of negotiation, it will be reasonable to bring
up for joint consideration the financial policies which help to deter-
mine the available **wage fund.** In this way, employees will get a knowl-
edge about the financial situation which will show whether the proposed
profit-sharing plan is developing out of sound beginnings.
1 The following material is principally from Tead & Metcalf, Personnel
Admini stra tion
,
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1933, pp.
315-318,
“c
c
It may be objected that such control may eventually lead the
workers to demand higher wages, which might begin to encroach upon pro-
fits. Logically, management should have no objection if some part of
what might otherwise become net income goes in higher employee drawing
accounts rather than in profit distribution. The fullest possible knowl-
edge about financial affairs must be available as affording a basis for
intelligent action. Account would also have to be taken of the relation
of profits to credits, to extension of plant, to taxes, to advance pur-
chases of raw materials, and the effects of getting wages too far out of
line with wage rates in other firms. There would still be a possibility
that workers might desire to increase wages at the expense of reserves
and surpluses necessary for use in profitless periods and for extension
of plant. In this case the educational value of joint conference must
be relied upon.
B. Successful Plans
If a profit-sharing plan survives its first few years, its
chances of failure are substantially reduced. Only about twenty-five
percent of the plans initiated since 1923 have been in force for more
than fifteen years. Nevertheless, in 1943 many of the companies report-
ing discontinuance of plans had given a fair trial to profit sharing,
since fifty-four percent of the plans had functioned for more than five
years at the time they were abandoned; forty-three percent, for six to
fifteen years; and eleven percent, more than fifteen years. Forty-six
percent remained in operation five years or less. ^
^ Stewart, Bryce LI. and Couper, Walter J., op. cit
.
, pp. 34-35.
'- I
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The purpose in introducing a profit-sharing plan is a major
factor in determining its success, for the character of business, size
and location of company, and the age of its plan do not, in themselves,
affect its successful operation. One purpose that stands out prominent-
ly as having been accomplished with considerable success is the adjust-
ment of compensation. Very few of the plans established for this pur-
pose have been discontinued. The reason for discontinuance was that the
fixed wage was less than the nominal wage rate, in these cases, and when
the first year of unprofitable operation followed many profitable ones,
the plan did not function because the workers had come to look upon the
nominal rate as the fixed wage.
In establishing profit-sharing plans, the other purpose that
has met with a high degree of success is the promotion of thrift. These
plans have been unlimited in character, and seem to be especially popu-
lar in large establishments. The savings feature of these plans provide
for cooperative efforts by the company and the employees, regular and
sustained savings by the latter being supplemented by payments from the
company. The profit sharing portion is determined differently in each
plan, but the goal in the majority of plans is to set the share of pro-
fits to be allocated to the savings fund at an amount which in normal
years will, at least, duplicate the amount saved by the employees.
The reduction of Is. bor turnover has long been one of the
chief objectives in profit sharing. The apparently successful achieve-
ment of this objective, however, has lost some of its significance in
recent years. During World War II the necessity of reducing an ex-
cessively high rate of labor turnover was a pressing industrial problem
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and not only profit sharing but many other activities in the industrial
relations field were introduced with this end in view. With the end of
the war this problera has become less acute.
Another objective which has seemed to meet with qualified
success is that of stimulating extra effort. In plans that have this
purpose, profit sharing becomes, in effect, a bonus plan. From the
standpoint of type of plan, a large degree of success has been attained
when these plans have been limited to executives. Cases of this type
have been abandoned because under the terms of the plans, the profit
shares of the executives remained in the business as credits to their
accounts. These credits became so great that it was feared that a sudden
demand for their liquidation might embarrass the cash position of the
company.
Profit sharing payments as a reward for effort can be said to
be successful when the employees covered by the plan are limited to ex-
ecutives and department heads, or in other words, to those who understand
its possibilities and are in a position to contribute actively to the
profit of the enterprise.
The Adamson Story ^
In 1946, Cecil F. Adamson, an industrialist in East Palestine,
Ohio, caused much comment by making use of an old device
—
profit sharing.
It is, however, profit sharing with a difference. The plan is a drastic
one, which most companies would be apt to shy away from. For one thing,
1 Principally from Reader’s Digest
,
(March 1947) Vol. 50, No. 299, pp.
105-108.
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it involves union participation in the solution of production problems,
and opening the books to the union. For another, 50 percent of profits
before taxes constitute the pool from which shares are distributed.
These measures contain the ingredients to make a success of the plan.
These are
:
1. A full and complete acceptance of the union, xvith continuing
collective bargaining.
2. Partnership by both parties.
3. Participation in the solution of production problems.
4. A clear relationship between efforts and returns to the
employees.
The Adamson Company, Inc., is personally managed by Mr. Adamson.
The company he runs is not big business. The gross is somewhere in the
neighborhood of $1,000,000 a year; the output is welded steel storage tanks
sold mainly to oil companies and gas stations. It has always been a
going concern, even during the depression; the wages have been high; and
the prices have been fairly low.
The United Steel Workers of America organized the plant in 1937.
Before this, there had been a history of turbulence, of strikes and union-
breaking. With the union came labor-management production committees, which
functioned during the war period. This experience was helpful in condition-
ing both union and management representatives for the problems involved in
the installation and development of a profit-sharing plan. The workers
learned how to participate and the management learned how to deal with con-
structive ideas.
A union committee, appointed for the purpose, worked with
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Adamson, studying the existing profit-sharing plans. Some companies asked
their workers to contribute a portion of their wages to be matched by com-
pany contributions out of profits. Others tied up the profit-sharing fund
for old-age pensions, sick benefits or severance pay. A few gave a share
of the profits outright, but did it at the end of the year and at the
discretion of the owners. The provisions of the plan finally arrived at
were simple and direct; 50 percent of the profits before taxes furnished
th® pool from which the shares were to be distributed on a monthly basis.
Bach employee’s share was to be applied on a percentage basis to his total
earnings of the month. The share was payable on the eleventh day of the
succeeding month.
The plan was to have gone into effect on January 1, 1945, but
the National War Labor Board’s restrictions prevented the application.
Joseph Scanlon, of the United Steelworkers' National, was petitioned for
assistance, and with the original committee, drew up a substitute plan
which was acceptable to the Board. The agreement reached ivas based on a
ratio of labor costs to sales value of production. This ratio had re-
mained fairly constant during the 1938-1944 period. Its high point was
1 to 2.86 and its low, 1 to 2.69— with an average of 1 to 2.77. All em-
ployees, except the president of the company, participated in the bonus
on the basis of 1 percent increase in their earnings for each 1 percent
increase in efficiency. The ratio during the first nine months averaged
1 to 3.76. At the end of the first year’s operation, the company had
nearly doubled its profits. As a result, each employee had received a
monthly bonus which averaged 41 percent of his monthly earnings. During
this period market conditions had remained fairly stable, so that the
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increased profits could be attributed to increased worker efficiency.
In August, 1945, the NV/LB restrictions were removed, and it was
possible to apply the originally developed plan, which is a straight out
profit-sharing arrangement. The profit-sharing plan replaced the substi-
tute on January 1, 1946. The results achieved in 1946 were even better
than those accomplished in 1945. Despite a general wage and salary in-
crease in January, 1946, of approximately 19 cents per hour and a time
lag on compensating price increases, the employees’ share in 1946 was
above the 50 percent level, and the profits almost doubled the 1945 figure. 1
It has been pointed out that this union-blessed profit-sharing
plan has worked out for Adamson because (1) his company is a stable unit
where the demand is relatively predictable, (2) the happiness of his
labor force is the key to his profits, and (3) his working force is small,
numbering about 150 workers. In other industries profits may depend more
on styling, sales imaginations, advertising or engineering. Moreover,
Adamson has only one union local with which to deal. Jurisdictional rights
of two or more locals do not permit the sort of cooperative efficiency
and the occasional doubling-up needed to make tile Adamson idea work.
Beyond this, the corporate form of organization entails diffi-
culties: stockholders might object rather strenuously to a 50-50 split
of the profits with the labor force. And it is argued that few companies
make enough to cut such a share of profits with the workers. A vast in-
crease in the efficiency of a corporation such as General Motors might
not lead to a similar increase in the worker’s income, for the consumer
Joseph Scanlon, ’’Adamson and his Profit-Sharing Plan”, American Manage-
ment Association, Production Series Number 172, April 1947, p. 12.
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would insist upon a price cut. .also, the plan was installed during a
boom period rather than a depression.
The success of the Adamson Plan rests on the application of
sound principles of partnership to that company’s specific situation.
The formula might work efficiently for the many partnerships and family-
owned businesses that are in operation, but the program would have to be
tailored to the particular circumstances of these companies.
C. Discontinued Plans
Management has indicated various reasons for discontinuance of
plans. Profit sharing, as a principle, in many cases was not abandoned,
but the basis for its application was revised, while in other instances
the substitution was in the nature of a bonus unrelated to profits, or a
retirement plan.
Historically the failures in profit-sharing have been attribu-
table to arbitrary introduction by management; paternalism and lack of
democracy in operation; failure of workers to relate infrequent profit
sharing with daily efficiency on their jobs; and ill-will engendered
among workers when management failed to make expected profits or when
"drone" workers received as large shares as the efficient workers.
The success or failure of profit sharing does not seem to be
closely allied to the particular specifications of the plan in many cases,
but rather to psychological and economic factors. It was found in 1936
that twenty-nine percent of the plans were abandoned because of either
employer or employee dissatisfaction with the results, thirty-six per-
cent of the schemes were discontinued because there were no profits to
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distribute or the company had gone out of business or had changed hands.
In slightly more than a tenth of the plans, another form of benefit had
been substituted for profit sharing.'*'
The reasons for employer and employee dissatisfaction with
profit sharing stem largely from the employee's lack of understanding
of the principles involved and their inability to comprehend the influence
of the business cycle upon profits. The profit-sharing plan apparently
works fairly well as long as the company prospers, but dissatisfaction
arises when profits diminish or disappear.
An unavoidable defect of profit sharing, especially from the
standpoint of the worker, is that profits are influenced by so many ex-
traneous factors over which he has no control, no matter how diligently
he works. A change in the price structure, a turn in the business cycle,
or an unforeseen contingency, such as war, can affect the prosperity of
the business far more than do the acts of employees.
Lack of employee interest in profit sharing was another leading
cause of discontinuance. This indifference arose because the profit dis-
tribution was so long delayed that the employee could not visualize the
connection between his efforts and the bonus.
Another reason for employees' dissatisfaction was their un-
willingness to accept the principles of profit sharing, even though they
shared only in the gains and not in the losses. If the company has any
money to distribute, they reason, the extra compensation should be put
in the weekly pay envelope where they can count on it instead of making
1 Brower, op.
,
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them wait six montns or a year for money which may not be forthcoming.
If the prof it-shar ing plan is to succeed, the wage scale in
the company contemplating profit sharing should equal or exceed the
going rate in the community for similar tasks. It should be impressed
upon the worker that the supplemental bonus depends upon profits and is
in no respect a part of wages.
The reasons given for abandoning profit-sharing plans established
for the purpose of stimulation efficiency indicate that this purpose has
not generally been fulfilled. Some plans were discontinued because profit
sharing did not prove to be a stimulus to greater efficiency, some were
replaced with other forms of incentive plans, and the rest were abandoned
because the employees were dissatisfied with profit sharing.
The other largely unsuccessful purpose for profit sharing is
the improvement of morale. By means of profit sharing, management had
hoped to awaken within the employees a sense of partnership in the busi-
ness, as a result of which renewed interest and activity would increase
the profits of the company by an amount greater than that paid out in
a profit sharing bonus to employees. Discontinuance was due to dissatis-
faction with the results of the plans. The cause most frequently given
for discontinuing profit sharing intended to bolster morale is general
dissatisfaction, and the second most frequent is that it is harmful to
the company in years of low profit. The most common complaint against
profit sharing is that the employees come to look upon the profit sharing
payment as an established part of their wage and, therefore, not only
does it cease to be an incentive, but when the payments to employees are
decreased or discontinued in years of reduced profits the workers look
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upon this loss as an unwarranted reduction of their normal income.
Notwithstanding many cases of dissatisfaction, there are in-
stances of expressed confidence and satisfaction on the part of the
management of companies operating under profit sharing for the purpose
of improving and sustaining morale. The success of profit sharing as
a specific builder of company morale is not established. The influence
of other factors upon industrial relations leaves in doubt the part that
profit sharing may play. The evidence indicates that profit sharing has
been a minor factor in this relation, and it may be said that in this
respect it has failed to live up to the expectations of its sponsors.
During the war years other reasons given for discontinuing
profit-sharing plans were: government interference in business, creating
too much uncertainty to permit definite planning; increase in costs; and
unsettled labor conditions.
The General Electric Plan
In October 1947, the General Electric Company, the nation’s
largest producer of electrical equipment decided to abolish the profit-
sharing plan under which it distributed #3,000,000 among its 160,000
employees earlier in the year. In discontinuing the 13-year-old plan
no change was made in the ’’extra compensation” plan for General Electric
executives.
It was asserted that there was no inconsistency in abolishing
one plan and keeping the other. The profit-sharing program for production
workers no longer served its purpose of promoting employee interest in
the welfare of the business. The extra compensation plan did serve as
an incentive to executives to enhance the prosperity of the company and

to create more jobs and more earnings for General Electric employees.
The General Electric profit-sharing plan was established in
1S16 by the company and was given to employees dependent upon their
length of service. For service of over five years, production employees
were given five percent supplementary to their annual compensation.
Executives shared in the profits dependent upon annual net profits. In
1931 the plan for rank and file employees was dropped, and was reinstated
in 1934 with a variation. Instead of a fixed charge, 12.5 percent of net
profits were distributed to those production workers receiving less than
$4,000 a year.
The company's decision was contested by the C.I.O. United Elec-
trical, Radio and Machine Workers, which represents the General Electric
production employees. It was said that withdrawal of the profit-sharing
payments would deprive workers of funds at a time when prices and profits
were at record heights. Abolition of the plan will be taken into account
when new wage demands are made.
Profit-sharing payments will continue to be made on the company’
1947 earning and the last distribution will be in March or April 1948
after the company's annual financial statement is published.
The General Electric president, Charles E. Wilson, said that
union representatives had been warned in contract negotiations in April
1947 that any further increase in wages would be followed by the elimin-
ation of the profit-sharing plan. The union won a general increase
averaging 15fr cents an hour for its members.
D. Methods of Plan Operation
Since 1923, on the average, profit-sharing payments represented
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2.2 percent of payroll, 6.8 percent of net operating profits, and 9.9
percent of dividends. For plans covering all employees, the average
annual profit-sharing payment was $266; for those covering chief executive
and/or managerial employees, $1,300; and for all plans, $750. 1
One of the factors determining the advisability of profit shar-
ing is the problem that arises in years when profits are insufficient to
warrant allocation to the fund for distribution. Most companies indicate
that no contributions are made until all losses have been made up; a
few companies report that contributions are withheld until profits are
resumed; the remaining companies had created reserve funds from which
amounts could be transferred to the profit-sharing fund in no-profit
years.
The following summary indicates the general grouping of
methods in representative plans: 2
Company A. Unlimited plan established in 1887. One
fifteenth of net profits before deduction of taxes is
set aside for employees. Fifty percent of employees’
share is paid in cash and the balance is paid into a
fund to provide death benefits and retirement incomes.
Company B. Unlimited plan started in 1907. From net
profits, six percent is paid in dividends and six per-
cent to a sinking fund. The balance is distributed to
employees on the basis of their earnings, half in cash
and half in company stock.
Company C. Unlimited plan started in 1906. Employees
receive the same percentage of their earnings that stock-
holders receive in dividends.
1 Stewart and Couper, op. cit., pp. 36-41.
' '
The following material is from National Industrial Conference Board,
Profit Sharing
,
New York, 1934. pp. 8-12.

Company D. Unlimited plan introduced in 1S05 and re-
vised in 1925. After eight percent of net profits
is paid to capital, the balance is divided equally,
one half to capital and the other half to employees.
Payments to employees are based on their earnings and
are paid four times a year.
Company E. Unlimited plan established in 1902 and
revised in 1920. After taxes, depreciation, other
fixed charges and regular dividends have been deducted,
fifty percent of the balance is paid to employees sith
three or more years service in the form of seven per-
cent preferred stock.
Company F. Unlimited plan started in 1907. All em-
ployees with three months’ service share in distribu-
tion, receiving certificates bearing five percent in-
terest and redeemable in company stock when issued.
Distribution is made on basis of earnings and service
of employees. Service ratings start at five percent
for six months’ service and increase five percent for
each year to a maximum of fifty percent.
Company G. Unlimited plan adopted in 1916. Five per-
cent of the amount available for payment of dividends
on common stock is distributed to employees in propor-
tion to their earnings.
Company H. Plan adopted in 1929. After eight percent
of net profits have been paid to capital, the balance
is distributed to employees, twenty-five percent of
the total going to executives, and seventy-five percent
to other employees with at least five years service
on a basis of length of service and earnings.
Company I. Unlimited plan started in 1921. Employees
are paid a regular wage and also a service wage which
adds one percent for three months’ service to the regular
wage, five percent for one year’s, ten percent for five
years’ and twelve percent for ten years’ or over. After
taxes, preferred dividends and seven percent for common
stock and for surplus have been set aside, half of the
balance of net profits is distributed among employees.
Payments to individuals are based on their earnings,
twenty-five percent on regular wages and seventy-five
percent of .service wages.
Company J. Unlimited plan adopted in 1933. After six
and a half percent has been paid to capital, one quarter
of the balance is distributed among employees. The sys-
tem of weighting for determining individual shares is on

the basis of twice their salaries for officers, one-
and-a-half tines their salaries for department heads
and salesmen, the amount of their earnings for other
employees with five years’ service, one half their
earnings for three to five years' service, and one
quarter for one to three years' service.
Company K. Unlimited plan started in 1926 in small
company with twenty employees. All profits, after
eight percent has been paid on stock, are distributed
among employees. Payments to individuals are based
on earnings and service, with one year's service rat-
ing one percent; two years' one and a fourth percent;
three years', one and a half percent; four years',
one and three-fourths percent; and five years' or
more, two percent of earnings.
Company L. Unlimited plan started in 1913. After
ten percent is deducted for dividends, the balance
is distributed on the basis of five percent for six
months' service; six percent for two years’; seven
percent for three years'; nine percent for five years’;
and ten percent for six years' or longer. No payments
are made to employees who own company stock.
Company M. Unlimited plan started in 1917 and revised
in 1933. Employees contribute five percent of their
earnings and the company contributes fifty percent of
net profits after dividends to a fund for providing
death benefits and retirement incomes.
Company N. Limited plan adopted in 1923. Employees
.earning over $1,800 a year, except management and
sales employees, participate in a distribution of
one third of net profits in excess of five percent,
but not more than ten percent, plus fifteen percent
of net profits in excess of ten percent.
Company 0. Limited plan started in 1916. Key men
receive the same percentage of net profits that is
paid on stock in excess of six percent. 'Bius, a ten
percent dividend to stockholder would result in four
percent payments to participating employees.
Company P. An unlimited plan adopted in 1933, combines
profit sharing and retirement incomes. Employees with
at least six months* service share twenty percent of
net earnings before deduction of federal income taxes
or dividends. Part of this fund purchases the employ-
ee's share of an annuity, to begin at age 65 for men
and 60 for women, of one and a half percent of their

average monthly earnings for each year of service.
The accrued old age liability is otherwise provided
for by the company, \7hat remains from the profit shar-
ing allotment after the payments for annuities is dis-
tributed in cash on the basis of earnings. Employees
laid off in slack seasons do not lose their claim to
a share of the profits.
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CHAPTER IV
IV. Factors Affecting Profit-Sharing Plans
In recent years, and especially after the beginning of World
War II, profit sharing has been confronted with new difficulties. These
come from publicity and governmental restraints on executive compensa-
tion, United States Treasury regulations, wage and salary stabilization,
and the uncertainty of the attitude of the courts.
A. Publicity and Governmental Restraints L
Companies under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission are directed to send proxies to stockholders giving
full details of any proposed plan of executive compensation. The Revf
enue Acts of 1934 and 1938 have also given publicity to executive com-
pensation over a specified amount. In 1934 the annual compensation of
employees over $15,000 had to be reported to "the Secretary of the Treas-
ury, and he in turn reported to Congress. The Act of 1938 set the limit
at $75,000, rescinding the former minimum of $15,000. The reports of
both the Treasury and the Securities and Exchange Commission may be in-
spected by the public. Litigation initiated by stockholders, investi-
gations by equity receivers, bankruptcy trustees and governmental agencies
have brought disclosures on corporate payments to executives and have
contributed to publicity of executive compensation.
Other actions of the government have imposed restraints on
^ This material and that on taxation were derived principally from
Washington, G. T.
,
Corporate Executives 1 Compensation
,
New York:
Ronald Press, 1942, 519 pp.
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executive compensation. In 1933 salaries of employees of air and ocean
mail contractors were limited, but in 1938 the statute was amended to
apply only to ocean mail carriers. In 1933 the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation was not permitted to loan to companies which paid compensa-
tion in excess of what appeared reasonable to the Corporation. The
Vinson Act of 1934 and subordinate Treasury Decision 5000 required re-
fund to the United States Treasury of all profits in excess of stated
percentages in fulfilment of contracts for aircraft and vessels for the
Army and Navy. Bonuses to employees, but not to officers, were held an
allowable cost if reasonable and if related to service necessary to the
contract. In 1940 the second Revenue Act largely superceded these limit-
ing provisions, but Treasury Decision 5000 remained of first-rate im-
portance. Some contracts made by the Maritime Commission for the con-
struction of ships contained clauses tending to restrict salaries paid
to officers of the contractors. They require return of profits in ex-
cess of ten percent and limit to $25,000 the amount of any single salary
which may be taken into account in determining costs. The War Depart-
ment’s fixed-fee construction contracts tied executive compensation to
individual earnings in the preceding year, plus such increase as the con-
structing officer may approve.
B. Taxation
The higher corporate and personal income taxes of the war years
imposed severe restraints on executive compensation. If a company paid
unreasonably large compensation, the amount in excess of the level of
reasonableness would not be allowed as a deduction and the tax paid by
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the company would be correspondingly increased. The Economic Stabiliza-
tion Act looks with disfavor as an attempt to evade taxation the giving
in a profitable year of bonuses or substantial salary increases in a-
mounts sufficient to absorb a considerable part of the profits.
Increased income taxes have greatly reduced the net compensa-
tion of higher salaried company officials. Some executives have tried
to recover the loss incurred by negotiating tax free, tax reimburse-
ment or tax anticipation contracts and deferred compensation plan with
their managements.
Higher taxation has not only given an impetus to profit shar-
ing for rank and file employees, in the form of profit-sharing retire-
ment plans, but also for executives, as a means of recouping for them
the reduction in their net incocBS at slight cost by reason of the
savings in taxes.
One duty of the Subcommittee of the Committee on Finance, in
its investigation, was to consider whether the government should encour-
age profit sharing through, for example, the grant of compensatory tax
exemptions and tax reward when profit sharing is voluntarily established.
The Subcommittee recommended a profit-sharing-savings-retirement fund,
and in the body of the report, gave favorable consideration to the ex-
emption from all income taxes of payments to employees from a cumulative
profit-sharing retirement fund and also to the issuance and sale of
United States government profit-sharing fund bonds available only for
profit-sharing funds and issued for the protection of profit-sharing fund
investments. However, in the end no legislation was recommended.

G. Recent Legal Developments
Most of the prewar type of profit-sharing plans were of the
discretionary or immediate-distribution type. Management decided in
its sole discretion, the amount of profits to be distributed at the end
of any taxable year—or to skip the contribution; whether the profit
sharing would be done before or after a basic return on capital; who
should get those profits, whether they should be apportioned to manage-
ment alone, to labor alone, or to both; whether the allocation vo uld be
merely in proportion to salary or whether weighting should be given to
years of service and to merit; whether distributions should be made in
cash or accumulated; whether the accumulations should be paid out from
time to time at the discretion of management or at fixed contingencies,
such as death, disability, retirement, or severance of employment;
whether accumulations should be invested in company’s securities; whether
to continue the plan or terminate it. Most of the profit-sharing plans,
whether discretionary or formal, distributed the profit shares immediate-
ly—either in cash or by participation in employee common stock.
In the wartime type of profit-sharing plans, salary and wage
stabilization forbade new immediate-distribution types without government
al approval, but it permitted those of the accumulation type. The com-
pany must in nearly all cases secure explicit approval for the initiation
of a profit-sharing plan or for the significant modification of any exist
ing plan from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, if it is intended to
charge profit-sharing payments to operating costs. An employer creating
a profit-sharing trust must make certain that it is in compliance with
Section 165 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, as amended by the Revenue
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Act of 1S42. This requires that payments into the fund must be made
according to a definite formula which leaves the company no powers of
discretion and does not discriminate in favor of higher paid employees.
The allocation, in most cases, must be proportioned to individual earn-
ings, and the plan must have general application. During most of the
war period, approval was also required from the War Labor Board and the
Salary Stabiliz ation Unit of the Treasury with respect to compliance
with the Economic Stabilization Act of 1942.
Before 1942 profit sharing by a company was not surrounded
with government regulations. If cash bonuses were distributed to employ-
ees, the individual employee recorded his share as income in his tax re-
i
turn and the company charged its total contribution to operating expenses.
As regards plans established after the Economic Stabilization
Act of 1942, since they obviously would amount to an increase in pay,
approval of the War Labor Board and the Salary Stabilization Unit was
required. Approval was dependent upon the inclusion of provisions for
distribution only on death, retirement, sickness or disability, with cash
distributions to active employees permitted only after a fixed period,
not less than ten years, and thereafter over a period of at least ten
additional years, and distribution upon termination of employment of not
over twenty percent of the participation employee’s total credits in any
one year after such termination.
The lifting of restrictions on certain wage and salary increases
by Executive Order No. 9599 in 1945 wiped out the need for obtaining ap-
proval for all types of such increases, including profit-sharing plans,
as long as they were not to be used as the bases for seeking an increase
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in price ceilings, or for resisting justifiable reductions in price ceil-
ings, or for an increase in costs to the United States Government.
A ruling of the Bureau of Internal Revenue on October 4, 1945,
interpreted the order in its application to stock bonus and profit-shar-
ing plans as follows:
. . .
(Plans) intended to meet the requirements of
Section 165 (a) of the (Internal Revenue) Code, as
amended, may now provide for immediate lump-sum pay-
ments of the benefits other than those upon the death,
retirement, sickness or disability of the employee
without the necessity of approval for salary stabil-
isation purposes, if the payments of such benefits
are made upon the conditions prescribed in Executive
OrderNo.9599 (price ceiling relief). It should be
observed, however, that provisions for lump-sum pay-
ments which effect a liquidation of the trust and
cause the termination of the plan may result in re-
troactive disqualification of the plan and a finding
that the trust was not at any time entitled to ex-
emption under Section 165 (a). ... Since the pay-
ment of benefits of any type under a stock bonus,
profit-sharing or other employees’ plan is governed
by the express provisions with respect thereto in
the plan, or trust agreement forming a part thereof,
it should be noted with respect to the stock bonus
and profit-sharing plans now in effect that appropri-
ate amendments may be necessary before benefits other
than those on death, retirement, sickness or disability
of the employee may be paid in a lump sum, or in any
other accelerated manner, upon the happening of the
contingency involved. Plans previously approved as
meeting the requirements of Section 165 (a) of the
code which are thereafter amended only to accelerate
(subject to the conditions prescribed in Executive
Order No. 9599) the payment of such benefits need
not be resubmitted for rulings on the qualifications
of the plans, as so amended, under Section 165 (a). ^
Most existing approved 165 (a) profit-sharing plans were
established before the Treasury executed its rules and before the fact-
J
- PS No. 53, issued October 4, 1945, by the Pension Trust Division of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

finding issue was raised. For instance, some of the things employers did
not know when most existing profit-sharing plans were established are:
1. That the board of directors would not have discretion in
determining the amount of profits to be allocated from year to year
( IT 5661, released May 25, 1944).
2. That profit-sharing plans could not be terminated at will
( IT 5661, and PS 52 , released August 9, 1945).
3 0 That profit-sharing plans would not be allowed to weight
for past service if such weighting resulted in discrimination in favor
of the highly compensated ( IT 3685 and IT 3686 , August 28, 1944).
4. That the Treasury would make a distinction between pension
and profit-sharing plans ( IT 3660 , May 23, 1944).
5. That investment of profit-sharing trust funds in the stock
or securities of the employer would mean that there must be full dis-
closure of the reasons and conditions (Section 29. 165-1 (a) of Regula-
tions 111
,
July, 1943 and PS j49, June 16, 1945).
6. That discrimination in favor of employee stockholders would
not be permitted the thirty percent rate. In general, all stockholder
employees holding ten percent or more of voting stock, directly or indi-
rectly, cannot together get more than thirty cents of each dollar the
employer contributes each year to the plan. ( IT 3674 , July 11, 1944).
7. That salary classification profit-sharing plans would not
necessarily be considered discriminatory (Mimeograph 5539 , July, 1943,
and subsequent releases).
8. That vesting might be required under profit-sharing plans
(PS 22, September 2, 1944)
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9. That early termination of plans would be considered evidence
that they were not bona fide plans (PS 7 , July 29, 1944).
10. That employer contributions to pension plans need not be
fixed level premium payments (Legislative history, Internal Revenue Code
regulations and rulings).
11. That a formula requiring contribution of a specified per-
centage of compensation regardless of profits is not a profit-sharing
plan (PS 24 , September 2, 1944).
12. That while new rulings have generally no retroactive
effect, with respect to specified important rulings, plans previously
approved must be amended by the end of the taxable year following the
year in which the ruling was issued, retroactive to the beginning of
such following year. This is true with respect to integration, stock-
holder rule, and definite formula (PS 55 Revised , November 16, 1944).
13. That stock bonus or profit-sharing plans may not be used
to meet the cost of pension plans (PS 57
,
October 7, 1944).
14. That deductions are allowable only with respect to con-
tributions made by an employer for his own employees in a joint profit-
sharing plan maintained by affiliated employers where the contribution
formula is based upon consolidated net income (regardless of whether em-
ployers filed consolidated or separate returns) (PS 51, Part B , July
31, 1945).
D. Attitudes of the Courts.
To the uncertainty created by the regulations is added a further
great uncertainty about the attitude of the courts. In enforcing the
tc
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Treasury’s regulations, the courts have been concerned with the question
of tax evasion. They have not considered it their function in this area
to protect stockholders against unduly high executive and employee com-
pensation. The cases since 1942 involving Section 165 (a) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code are few and most of them deal with bonus payments. The
court applied a test of reasonableness in each of these cases and asked
whether the amount distributed was "reasonable” and represented compensa-
tion for "reasonable" services rendered. If so, it was held that such
payments could be deducted as ordinary and necessary expenses of the
business. But the test of reasonableness cannot be analyzed in general
terms, since such variable factors as size of the corporation, the number
of employees affected, whether the compensation v;as determined for fam-
ily relationship and stockholding reasons, absences of executives for
long periods during the year, etc., lead to apparent inconsistencies in
the decisions. A principal question is whether executives were simply
snaring in profits of undue financial and industrial concentration or
whether it was merely a case of big companies paying big compensation.
This question was brought to the fore by the litigation in the cases of
the American Tobacco Co., the National City Bank of New York City,
Marner Bros. Pictures, the National Cash Register Co., Loew’s Inc.,
General Motors Corji, and the Bethlehem Steel Corporation.

CHAPTER V
V. Relation of Profit Sharing to Present Trends
A. As a Remedy for Economic Instability
In England in the eighties and in the United States in 1937
the organization of unskilled workers into trade-unions was followed by
labor crises. The economic waste and political unrest resulting from
sit-down strikes led to a search for remedies. Profit sharing arose
from obscurity as one of the antedotes to labor warfare in England then
and to sit-down strikes in the United States now.
Profit sharing has larger implications than attaining peace- -
ful labor relations. Its xvide extension should help to smooth out the
fluctuations in the business cycle and thus check the inroads of the
State on private business enterprise during depressions. Tnere are
many theories of the cause of business cycles. One group of causes has
certain elements in common, disequilibrium in income and purchasing
power and resulting inability to buy the goods produced. Herein may lie
one significant use of profit sharing. It makes wages vary with profits,
or selling prices. It stabilizes profits, industrial production, employ-
ment, and consumer purchasing power. If wages and other costs are rigid
when prices fall, profits turn to losses and threaten bankruptcy. There
is a need for flexible costs to avoid violent fluctuations in earnings
and in production of a corporation or an economic society.
Aside from the economic or cyclical factors, profit sharing
has political implications. If we avoid those wage practices which
cause violent fluctuations in the economy, with the resulting national
economic instability and insecurity for the individual, and the turning
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toward government for relief, we can continue to function under our sys-
tem of private enterprise. The system of private enterprise has the
manifest advantages of flexibility and opportunities for individual
effort. Profit sharing between capital and labor opens possibilities of
an evolution along new lines. Critics of the corporation and of modern
society charge and cite concentration of wealth and power in great eco-
nomic aggregation, absentee ownership, the separation of ownership and
management, the separation of ownership and labor. A scheme of profit
sharing would give the worker a sense of ownership in the plant to the
extent that he participates in the profits. It would reconcile many of
the conflicting interests of labor and management.
3. Labors' Attitude Toward Profit Sharing
By the turn of the century profit sharing had begun to attract
the attention and arouse the opposition of organized labor. Union leaders
felt it was a device to prevent workers from organizing and an excuse for
low wage rates and substandard conditions of employment. Labor feared
also that it might lead to sharing of losses during depressions. Samuel
Gompers said in 1899, ”... I would look upon such propositions with a
very great deal of suspicion. There have been few, if any, of these con-
cerns (companies with profit-sharing plans) that have even been compara-
tively fair to their employees.”
One hundred years ago when Leclaire attempted to introduce
1 United States House of Representatives, Report of the Industrial Com-
mission on the Relations and Conditions of Capital and Labor Employed
in Manufactures and General Business
,
Washington, 1901, (Document
No. 495) Vol. 7, pp. 644-645
.

profit sharing he was criticized by labor in France as attempting to re-
duce wages. In 1923-25 the British Trade Union Congress rejected copart-
nership and profit sharing as a device to mislead workers and prevent
trade-union solidarity. The union leaders' opposition is due to the fear
that harmony of interest between employer and employee would tend to the
abandonment of unions, to an aversion to strike and to lessening the im-
portance of labor union leaders.
Following are summarized statements by the two prominent labor
leaders in the United States. William Green, President of the American
Federation of Labor, in 1939, stated in effect that labor is not opposed
to the principal of profit sharing, but to the way in which it has been
developed and operated. Those plans which oppose collective bargaining
and trade unionism hinder the development of profit sharing on a sound
basis. Labor believes that all plans affecting labor must rest on col-
lective bargaining. Therefore, Mr. Green advocated that "all of the
terms and conditions of payment for work should be determined through
joint conferences of representatives of management and workers concerned
and carried to mutual agreement upon issues discussed. . . . Labor cannot
be asked to accept blindly management's decision on what constitutes pro-
fits. All of the facts must be available." 1 He states that the first
obligation of industry is to establish wage payments through collective
bargaining, to insure a decent standard of living. If, after this, the
earnings of the industry justify an equitable distribution of the profits
United States Senate, Survey of Experiences in Profit Sharing and
Possibilities of Incentive Taxation ... op. cit., pp. 105-106.• • •
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of the industry between investors, managejiient
,
and employees, then let
it be done cooperatively.
John L. Lewis, President of the Congress of Industrial Organ-
izations in 1939, and now head of the United Mine Workers, agreed with
Mr. Green’s statement that collective bargaining with employers must be
used in regard to wages, hours, and working conditions. After adequate
• wages have been established, then profit sharing may be installed, through
management-labor cooperation. ^
C. Conclusion
During most of the history of the profit-sharing movement
,
trade unions were weak, and management policy on the disposition of
company profits was little hampered by actions of unions or government.
The recent growth in the strength of unions, the greater intervention
of government in business by way of higher corporate and income taxes,
wage and salary control, publicity on executive compensation, and the
trend toward government policy in favor of low-incone groups weigh
heavily in management decisions on policy.
Such impetus as there is behind the profit-sharing concept
derives largely from three factors, (l) Management desires to secure
stability of wage costs. (2) Management believes that enabling the mem-
bers of the executive group to share in profits will aid in securing and
retaining competent executives. (3) Management, by distributing to em-
ployees excess profits that otherwide would largely be absorbed in taxes,
1 Ibid . , op. 105-107.2 Ibid
.
,
pp. 139-190.
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is able to cultivate employee good will at low cost.
Many profit-sharing plans for executives Lave been discontinued
because of unfavorable public reaction, and inability to effect an equit-
able distribution based on merit or accomplishment without charges of
discrimination. The hostile attitude of trade unions toward profit shar-
ing presents another problem. The unions hold that any profits a busi-
ness can afford to distribute to its employees should be included in their
basic wage rates.
The principal declared objectives of management as regards profit-
sharing plans are: (a) to provide an incentive for increased production,
(b) to promote employee security, (c) to advance the social status of the
worker by making him a part owner of the business and a participant in
its profits but not in its losses, and (d) to improve employer-employee
relations.
Profit-sharing plans represent the evolution of economic de-
mocracy as the complement to political democracy. Necessary, before a
profit-sharing plan can be installed, is a sound employee program.
The primary obligations of a company to its employees, as now
generally recognized, are (l) to maintain wage rates and conditions of
employment at least equal to those prevailing in the community for work
of the same kind, (2) to afford as high a degree of regular employment
as possible, and (3) to provide a reasonable measure of social security
beyond legal requirements. Profits remaining for possible distribution
to emplo 3rees should be directed to the fulfillment of these primary
obligations, first.
As stated before, the unions prefer to raise wages if there are
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excess of profits, instead of participating in a profit-sharing plan.
Recently, however, the American Federation of Labor has reconsidered the
problem, which was irritated by the Nathan Report. The situation is as
follows: In 1946 the Congress of Industrial Organizations claimed that
industry could pay a twenty-four percent or a thirty percent wage in-
crease without raising prices. Their efforts resulted in an 18g cent
wage formula (about 18g percent) and a living cost rise of equal amount.
They made the same kind of claim again in 1947, that industry can pay
a twenty -five percent wage increase without raising prices.
This claim is based on a report of Robert R. Nathan Associates
which reasons as follows: When profits of all corporations (after taxes)
are added together, the resulting figure is large enough to furnish a
twenty-five percent wage increase for their employees, provided that
profits retained by the corporations are cut back to the level which
prevailed in 1936 to 1939. In other words, a sixty-eight percent cut
in profits \wuld provide a total sum of money large enough to pay a
twenty-five percent wage increase.
According to the American Federation of Labor:
This figure on paper has nothing whatever to do with
the realities of industrial operation or with collec-
tive bargaining. Unions negotiate with thousands of
companies, each faced with different conditions affect-
ing their ability to pay higher wages. Some can pay
more, some less. There could be no pooling of profits,
such as the report presupposes, except under a totali-
tarian state. Even if it were possible to force a 25$
wage increase on American industry generally, the neces-
sary 68$ cut in profits would put thousands of compan-
ies out of business, and throw millions of workers out
of jobs; it would reduce profits to the low level of
1936 to 1939 when 8g- million were unemployed and in-
dustry was not earning enough for the normal new plant
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and equipment which expands production and raises liv-
ing standards.
It is true that many companies show enough profit in
1946 to allow for adequate plant expansion and also
provide substantial wage increases for workers. It
is vital that workers’ wages be raised by the highest
amount possible without increasing prices if our high
level of production and employment is to continue.
But it is not true that industry can afford a 25$
general wage increase in 1947. ^
A logical conclusion as to what can be done is the sharing of
profits. Since the objective of both labor and management is to raise
the standards of living by increased economic security, it is reasonable
to institute a high basic wage rate, which would include, and take into
consideration, the marginal producers. Over and above that basic wage,
the more efficient producer can distribute shares in profits.
Burritt sums up his conclusions as to the conditions under
which profit-sharing plans are applicable. He states that profit shar-
ing can encourage personal effort if used under the right conditions,
and that it is' especially good for stimulating effective management
—
mostly through departmental or unit profit sharing. Group plans are
useful in developing cooperation. Permanence of service is secured if
the plan is supplemented by proper selection, training, promotion policies,
and
proper working cond it ions
,
j
adequate wage and salary standards. Profit
sharing promotes industrial peace by expressing a desire for the right
management-labor relationship. However, profit sharing is not a substi-
tute for good management, nor for personality. There must also be enthusiasm,
1 American Federation of Labor, Labor’s hionthly Survey
,
(January 1947).
p.5.
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leadership, foresight and aggressiveness. It is not a substitute for the
wage system, as the flat wage is supplemented by an additional payment
representing a share in the profits. Finally, profit sharing cannot solve
all the problems of industrial relations. ^
Some authors argue that profit-sharing plans are not
,
and can
never be, a substitute for pension plans.
Increases in salary are fine; profit sharing plans
are fine; but neither serves the purpose for which a
soundly constructed pension plan is created. A com-
pany can function successfully without a profit shar-
ing plan if it has a retirement program, but thus far
the profit sharing plan alone has generally not proved
sufficient. 2
Undoubtedly profit-sharing plans are not a substitute for pensions.
Some companies, which are in the minority, have evolved desirable and sound
profit-sharing plans. Those companies generally have long-established ef-
fective successful pension systems, other forms of employee benefits, and
a well-rounded employee benefit system. Under these conditions profit-
sharing plans are generally successful. If the pension plan is ineffec-
tive, the employer would do better to enlarge the benefits under their
pension system by merging the two types of plans into one effective pension
plan. Employers with a profit-sharing plan, but no pension plan ,would do
better to merge the plan into an effective pension plan.
?Ihen can profit sharing be instituted, and under what conditions
will it be successful? To have a successful profit-sharing plan, the in-
dustrial atmosphere in any company must be healthy. Profit sharing involves
1 Burritt, op. cit
, pp. 249-257.
2 Buck, op. cit
..
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the question of timing. The correct time to evolve a plan is when reg-
ular wages are at least as high as the going rate paid in the community
and by competitors in communities of the same size and with approximate-
ly the same living costs. Also, previously installed pension, benefit
and welfare plans must be functioning satisfactorily. Finally, the
company’s relations, management, labor, public, and government, must be
sound. If these conditions are met, and if, most important, there are
enough profits to share, then the plan will be effective. To reiterate,
the type and timing of the plan are important.
. .
.
profit sharing in one form or another, has
been and can be eminently successful, when properly
established, in creating employer-employee relations
that make for peace, equity, efficiency, and content-
ment. We believe it to be essential to the ultimate
maintenance of the capitalistic system. We have found
veritable industrial islands of "peace, equity, efficien-
cy and contentment," and likewise prosperity, dotting
an otherwise and relatively turbulent industrial map,
all the way across the continent. This fact is too
significant of profit sharing’s possibilities to be
ignored or depreciated in our national quest for great-
er stability and greater democracy in industry. The
profit-sharing ideal, as an ideal, is invincible. 1
Profit sharing is an effective device in its approach to in-
dustrial relations, and national stability. To succeed, it must be built
upon a foundation of integrity and good faith, harmony and sincerity,
patience and tact. It requires moderation and progress. It calls for
enlightened leadership on both sides. It stresses social consciousness.
With these qualities, profit-sharing converts a visionary ideal into a
reality.
^ United States Senate, Survey of Experiences in Profit Sharing and
Possibilities of Incent ive Taxation; Report of the Subcommittee of
the Committee on Finance . . . Pursuant to S. Res. 215 .
.
Wash-
ington, 1939, (Report No. 610) p. 5.

APPENDIX A
HOW ERIC JOHNSTON PIANS TO SHARE PROFITS
Both profit-sharing and share-in-management features have been
applied before in American industry. Johnston’s plan is unusual in in-
terlocking the two in his four companies (in Spokane, Washington) in the
share of profits to be distributed—twenty-five percent before taxes or
dividends—and in the variations made to meet conditions.
The basic formula for the profit-sharing plan is based on a
unit system. Employees receive:
1 unit for each $100 of annual compensation.
1 unit for each year of service.
5 units for each term on junior board of directors, non-cum-
ulative and for current year only.
5 units for supervisors.
15 units for assistant departmental managers.
25 units for departmental managers. ^
Production workers in the four companies belong to the American Federa-
tion of Labor unions with a total of six crafts and about the same num-
ber of locals. Labor relations are generally amicable. No changes in
wages, working conditions, or labor relations are contemplated. Execu-
tives of the four companies advise:
1. Application of any formula must be carefully fitted
to conditions in the company.
2. Every part of the program must be carefully explain-
ed to employees
•
3. Plans are above the zone of labor relations.
4. Management must be prepared for realistic reaction
from employees.
1 Notes and Quotes, op. cit .
>
July, 1946.
•
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5. Plans must be sincere, capable of being lived with.
They cannot pull labor relations' chestnuts out of
the fire. 1
In an article written at the time of installing this plan,
Johnston has presented his "Apologia Pro Vita Sua":
Under socialism, in theory, every man works for the
state. In return for this he is supposed to get se-
curity against the evils of life. The state is his
perpetual master, and he is presumably its loyal and
happy servant.
Under capitalism the theory is that every man is a
free agent, even though he is on someone else's pay-
roll. Nobody can tell him what job to take or how
long to hold it. Nobody, we say, stops an employee
from blossoming into an employer.
Here in America, which represents the fullest develop-
ment of the capitalistic system, we assure each other
firmly that we believe in it with all our hearts. But
we know our system is far from perfect. The imperfec-
tions permit e noisy minority to jab at sensitive spots
in the anatomy of capitalism. This scares some of the
believers in capitalism, who seem to be afraid to jab
back. Meanwhile, the most of Murope is going hell-bent
for socialism.
If we believe in capitalism as we say we do, it is
about time we went hell-bent for capitalism. So far,
in spite of our magnificent successes, some of which
we must admit were the result of fool’s luck, we have
given little more than lip service to the doctrine of
capitalism.
If capitalism involves a system of private enterprise,
that means we can't look to government to keep it alive
and to ma.ke it grow, because in that way lies statism.
If capitalism is a system wherein the individual is supreme
and supremely free, then it is up to us to insure that
this supreme freedom is not the privilege of a few in-
dividuals but of all. Benefits must go to all men along
with freedom of action.
7/e say that under capitalism every man has a chance to
take a chance. The unpleasant fact in this day is not
1 Idem
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every man can take a chance. Not every man shares
fully in the profits of the profit system.
The average American today is frustrated by his
inability to bet on himself. He knows that he is
in the capitalistic system, but he doesn't feel that
he is of it. He can count on nothing but his pay
envelope, and in bad times not always on that. He
works for a flat fee. He can't look forward to any-
thing but that flat fee. There is no excitement,
no adventure in that. Without an opportunity to
reap more from the profit system than a salary or
a wage, the average man cannot be blamed if he feels
no sense of kinship to the profit system.
Obviously, all people cannot have businesses of their
own, but this is no reason why they should not have
their American right to share more fully in the bene-
fits of our system. If they can't be in business
for themselves, they can be brought into closer part-
nership with their employers, and take chances on
the profits with them.
The four West Coast companies with which I am asso-
ciated had long sought a way to do this. We finally
came to the belief that an effective labor dividend
and multiple management program would bring about a
situation where our employees would say "we" instead
of "they."
We wanted our business enterprises to become joint
projects, with the interests of the owner and the
worker welding into one;we wanted our workers to
determine along with us the chances we should take,
and then share in the profits of those chances if
they should be realized. Welcoming the advice and
suggestions of the workers did not, of course, mean
that management renounced its right to manage. Final
decisions, we felt, properly lie with management,
but no management has a monopoly on ideas, and ideas
are the rarest gems in business.
There is nothing altruistic about our program. We
think the adoption of labor dividends and multiple
management is practical, realistic, and sound busi-
ness. We do not claim that our plan is the complete
answer to industrial strife. Nor that it is newly
invented. For years progressive businessmen have
worked toward the goal of giving their employees a
voice in the problems of their businesses and a fair
share of the fruits of their labor. We are simply

applying techniques of our own devising to our own
particular enterprises. We think that our program
will minimize human friction. But we know that any
such plan will operate successfully only if manage-
ment works at it as hard as management works at
turning out good products for good profits.
The labor dividends, our employees have been told,
are not intended to be substitutes for decent salaries
or fair wages. We intend to continue to bargain col-
lectively with our employees on rates of pay, hours
of work and working conditions.
The labor dividend is a reward for contribution to
the success of the business. The program is based
on 25 percent of the net operating profit before
taxes and dividends. We intend to pay it to em-
ployees in lump sums once a year. We have set up
a point system for employees, so that each will
receive his just portion, based on such things as
length of service, personal responsibility and the
going rate of fixed compensation. The principle is
this: to demonstrate to the worker the direct rela-
tionship between his production and his dividend.
There are other ways of applying incentives, of course-
stock distribution, production bonus system (both
individual and group), rewards for outstanding effort.
All of these point in the same direction.
Higher company earnings always flow from better man-
agement. The best management requires that all talent
within any business be called upon for ideas. We think
the best way to do this is through a multiple-manage-
ment plan. Ours will operate in each company through
a junior board of directors—seven members, a cross
section of office, sales and factory employees. After
the original selection new members of the junior board
are elected by the boards themselves. Every six months
there may or may not be a turnover of two members,
depending on the decisions of the junior boards them-
selves. Top management executives or senior board
members may not serve on the junior board.
The junior boards fulfill two essential purposes: they
supply ideas for betterment of the business and they
are training grounds for top management positions
—
perhaps, indeed, for membership on the senior direc-
tors’ boards.
Their plan in no way interferes with the union shop

committees which represent the organized workers in
our plants or their relationship with the management.
Aggressive ambition on the part of the individual is
the lifeblood of capitalism. The more of it we can
chum into action, the better for us. The two sys-
tems of capitalism and socialism will compete through-
out the world for the minds of men. The two systems
are on trial. In the final analysis that system which
provides the greatest benefit to the greatest number
of individuals will win out. I’m betting on capitalism.
Eric A. Johnston, ’’Labor Should Have a Stake in Capitalism,” The
York Times Magazine . February 2, 1946. p. 5.
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APPENDIX B 1
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF EIGHT PROFIT-SHARING PLANS FOR ALL EMPLOYEES
Company, Industry, Type
and Date of Plan
Eligibility
Requirements
Proportion of Annual
Profits allocated for
distribution
Andersen Corporation, 3 months’ service .after deducting from
Bayport
,
Minn. profits 6$ on invested
capital, a portion of
(Wooden window and door the remainder is alio-
frame s
)
cated to employees in
the ratio that total
Profit-sharing plan payroll bears to the
sum of capital invest-
Initiated 1914. ment and total payroll
with the balance al-
lotted to stockholders.
Eastman Kodak Company,
Rochester, N.Y.
(Photographic materials)
Wage Dividend Plan
Initiated 1912.
Employment at end
of preceding cal-
endar year and at
date of annual dis-
tributions, in
March.
0.005$ of participants*
compensation for pre-
ceding 5 years for
each dollar by which
common stock dividends
for preceding year ex-
ceed $3.50 per share.
Geo. A. Hormel and
Company
,
Austin, Minn.
(Slaughtering and meat
packing)
Joint earnings plan
Initiated 1938.
1 year of contin- A joint earnings ac-
uous service. count, which is the
gross income after
all expenses except
compensation of par-
ticipants
,
is alloca-
ted to employees and
stockholders on the
basis of a sliding scale,
but stockholders do
not participate until
participants receive
regular wages.
1 Stewart and Couper, op. cit
.
, pp. 122-123, 130-135, 1945

Basis of Apportionment Payment provisions
to Employees
In proportion to employee’s Cash, semiannually,
earnings, with executives
and foremen receiving
double the regular rate,
except that a portion of
the total allocation, not
to exceed 25$, is used to
pay 6$ interest to those
who have saved their profit-
sharing payments, with a view
to rewarding the saver at the
expense of the non-saver.
In proportion to employee's
earnings for preceding 5
years, with annual minimum
of $15.
Cash, annually.
Resignation (Except
females to marry)
or discharge: Em-
ployee forfeits wage
dividend.
In proportion to employee’s Cash, annually,
earnings
.
Administration
Management and em-
ployee represents'
tives.
Board of directors.
Board of directors.
/<
:
t
:
Company, Industry, Type
and Date of Plan
Eligibility
Requirements
Kansas City Public Service 3 months' contin-
Company uous service.
Kansas City, Mo. ’
(Utility)
Employees' Participation
Plan
Initiated 1931; revised 1941.
Criterion Machine Works,
Los Angeles, Calif.
(Machinery)
Employees' Profit-sharing
and Savings Plan.
Initiated 1940
1 year of contin-
uous service.
Contributions of
not less than 2-|$
or more than 5$ of
earnings, subject
to annual maximum
of $200.
Pacific National Bank of
Seattle
,
Seattle, Wash.
(Banking)
Employees' profit-sharing
Retirement Plan.
3 years' continuous
service.
Regular employment
of 20 or more hours
per week, 5 or more
months per year.
Initiated 1944; revised 1945.
Proportion of annual
,
Profits Allocated for
Distribution
25$ of net income after
taxes.
10$ of net operating
earnings after deduct-
ing all taxes, subject
to a maximum amounting
to 4 times employees’
contributions. In case
of company losses, no
allocations are made
in subsequent profit
years until loss is
made up.
5$ of net profits be-
fore taxes, subject
to an annual maximum
amounting to 15$ of
participants' compen-
sation, excluding in-
dividual earnings over
$12,000. When maximum
falls below 15$, great-
er allocations may be
made in succeeding
years in order to
level annual alloca-
tions at that maximum.
ct.
•
'•
t
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Basis of Apportionment
to Employees
Payment Provisions administration
In proportion to employee's Cash annually,
earnings.
In proportion to employee’s
contributions. Credits for-
feited as a result of em-
ployee resignation or dis-
missal are prorated to
other employees’ accounts
in proportion to their
credits in the fund.
Payments to employees
may be made in cash,
securities or both.
Retirement or Disability
Share of fund in full
or in 11 annual instal-
ments.
Death: Full share of fund
Resignation or Dismissal
Own contributions, and
§ of his share of com-
pany allocations, and
interest on both.
In proportion to employee's
earnings.
Credits forfeited as result
of employee resignation or
dismissal prior to 18 years
service are prorated to
other employees.
Payments may be made to
employees in cash, se-
curities, annuity or
endowment income con-
tract.
Retirement, Disability
or Death: Share or fund
in full or in instal-
ments of at least $300
each half year for not
more than 10 years.
Resignation or Dismissal
25$ of share, and addi-
tional 5$ for each year
of service, up to 100$
for 18 years* service.
Board of directors.
Admini strat ive
Agent : 3 manage-
ment and 2 em-
ployee represen-
tatives.
Investment Provision
restricted to U.S.
Government bonds,
notes, etc.
Admini strat ive
Agent: Board of
directors and
corporate trustee.
Investment Provision
Investment in com-
pany stock not
permitted.
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Company, Industry, Type
and Date of Plan
Eligibility
Requirements
Proportion of Annual
Profits Allocated for
Distribution
Albright -Nell Company,
Chicago, 111.
(Machinery and equipment
for meat packing and
allied industries)
Savings and Profit-sharing
Fund
Initiated 1937; revised 1944
2 years' contin-
uous service.
Contributions of
not less than 2%
or more than 5%>
of earnings, sub-
ject to annual
maximum of $200.
Participation com-
pulsory.
10% of net operating
earnings available
for dividends after
all expenses, taxes
and deductions author-
ized by board of
directors, subject to
a maximum amounting
to 4 times partici-
pants' contributions.
In case of company
losses, no allocations
are made in subse-
quent profit years
until loss is made up.
Procter and Gamble
Company
,
Ivorydale, Ohio.
(Soaps and edible fats
products)
Profit-sharing Dividends
for Employees Through
Stock Ownership.
1 year of contin-
uous service.
Contributions of
5% of earnings,
subject to annual
maximum of $100
for 6 years.
Employment on pro-
duction, operation,
maintenance or re-
lated work; regu-
lar annual earnings
of $3,000 or less if
employed on clerical,
sales, staff, super-
visory, technical, ad-
ministrative or execu-
tive work.
Company allocations are
determined quarterly on
the basis of length of
participation and of
total annual payroll
for participants, ex-
cluding individual
earnings over $2,000.
No account is taken
quarterly of earnings
of any participant in
excess of $500, but at
end of last calendar
quarter adjustments may
be made.
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Basis of Apportionment
to Employees
Payment Provisions Administration
In proportion to em-
ployee’s contribu-
tion.
Credits forfeited as
result of employee
resignation or dis-
missal or unpaid loan
are prorated to other
employees’ accounts
in proportion to their
contributions.
In proportion to em-
ployee's contribution
except that of com-
pany’s additional al-
location is distri-
buted in proportion to
employee's salary in
the ratio of 1 unit
for each 5 full years
of service.
Credits forfeited as
result of employee
resignation, dis-
missal or other ser-
vice termination are
prorated to other
employees in propor-
tion to their con-
tributions.
Payments to employees may be
made in cash, securities,
or both.
Retirement or Disability:
Share of fund in full or in
instalments over 10-year per-
iod.
Death: Full share of fund.
Dismissal, or Resignation of
Female to Marry: Employee’s
contributions, and at least
| of his share of company
allocations, plus interest
on both.
Resignation: Share of fund in
full after 11 years’ partici-
pation. Otherwise, payment a-
mounts to employee’s contri-
butions and interest thereon,
plus 50$ of company alloca-
tions and interest thereon
for less than 2 year's parti-
cipation and 5$ for each suc-
ceeding year of participation
Loans: Employee having unpaid
loan forfeits his share of
company allocations, and his
contributions are applied to
liquidate loan.
Administrative
Agent: 3 trustees
and 2 employee
representatives.
Investment Pro-
vision: An amount
at least equal to
employees' contri-
butions must be in-
vested in govern-
ment bonds or se-
curities approved
by Illinois laws
governing invest-
ment of trust
funds or in partici-
pating omployee
mortgages.
For first six years of partici- Administrative
pation, all funds used to pur- Agent: Board
chase additional stock. At the of 3 trustees
end of this period, employee re- appointed by
ceives all paid-up stock and any board of direc-
cash balance. After this, and if tors or em-
employee holds 50$ of his stock, ployees of the
dividends are paid quarterly in company,
cash. Investment Provision
Retirement, Disability or Death: Company stock ex-
All paid-up stock, plus any cash clusively.
balance, or proceeds from sale of
stock; if participant dies prior
to 6 years' participation, bene-
ficiary receives employee’s con-
tributions plus 6$ interest.
Resignation, Discharge or Withdrawal:
Employee's contributions, plus 6$
interest, or retention of stock
alter 6 years' participation.
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iiFPENDIX C
SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS OF FIVE NONTHUSTESD PROFIT-SHARING PLANS FOR EXECUTIVES
Company, Industry, Type
and Date of Plan
Eligibility Proportion of Annual
Requirements Profits Allocated for
Distribution
Johns-Manville Corporati
New York, N.Y. .
(Building materials)
Profit-sharing plan
Initiated 1930
Senior and junior ex-
ecutives and any
other employees who
make exceptional con-
tributions to profits,
excluding the presi-
dent .
At discretion of board
of directors, amount
not exceeding 7$ of
earnings, before taxes,
but after dividends
on the preferred stock
and dividends of $3
per share on common
stock. Part of this
amount is held as a
reserve fund for dis-
tribution to employees
other than executives
who make exceptional
contributions to profits.
Owens-Illinois Glass
Company
Toledo, Ohio.
(Bottles and glass con-
tainers)
Management Bonus Plan.
Initiated 1930; revised
1943.
At discretion of pres-
ident: general exec-
utives and major de-
partment heads. Pres-
ident and chairman of
board of directors.
The part of consolidated
net earnings, before
federal taxes and after
&2 per share on stock,
in excess of 10$ of in-
vested capital, is allo-
cated in the ratio that
aggregate salaries of
participants bear to
10$ of invested capital,
subject to annual max-
imum of 8$ of 10$ of in-
vested capital or 8$ of
net earnings in excess of
10$ of invested capital.
W.A. Sheaffer Pen Com-
pany,
Fort Madison, Iowa
(Pens and pencils)
Executive and Depart-
ment Head Special
Bonus
Initiated 1928, revised
1941.
Executives and department
heads in specified key
positions, determined
by management and board
of directors.
In proportion to amount
of dividends paid on
common stock.
-c
-
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Basis of Apportion- Payment Provisions
ment to Employees
At discretion of presi- Cash, annually,
dent, subject to board
of directors’ approval
following receipt of
recommendation of pro-
fit-sharing fund commit-
tee of board of directors.
Maximum individual share
is 25$ of salary.
In proportion to employ- Cash, annually,
ees’ earnings; president
determines proportion of
salaries to be considered.
Maximum individual share
is 100$ of salary.
Each position is graded Cash, quarterly,
and evaluated in terms
of a certain number of
shares of common stock.
Bonus is then equal to
dividends on stock,
weighted for each posi-
tion by number of shares
assigned to each posi-
tion.
Administration
President and board
of directors.
President and board
of directors.
Board of directors and
management.
.
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Company, Industry, Type
and Date of Plan
Eligibility
Requirements
Proportion of Annual
Profits Allocated for
Distribution
Studebaker Corporation,
South Bend, Ind.
(Automobiles)
Incentive Compensation
Plan.
Initiated 1940.
At discretion of board
of directors: execu-
tive and key employ-
ees.
10$ of excess of net pro-
fits before federal
taxes and before de-
ductions for the plan
itself, but after de-
ducting 6% of net worth
for 1940-1942. At dis-
cretion of board of
directors, in 1943-
1945, but amount dis-
tributed approximates
that of 1941, when one-
half amount of profits
available under formula
was distributed.
Eaton Manufacturing Com- Executive and admin-
pany, istrative officers
Cleveland, Ohio. and employees.
(Automotive and air-
craft parts)
Executive Contingent
Compensation Plan.
5% of net profits, after
deducting amount of
"contingent compensation"
if $1-1.99 per share;
6 and 2/3$ if $2-2.99
per share; 7-g$ if $3-
3.99 per share; 8$, if
$4 or more per share.
Initiated 1935
• c
c
AcLmini s trat ionBasis of Apportion- Payment Provisions
ment to Employees
At discretion of board
of directors. Cash, annually. Board of directors.
At discretion of committee Cash or treasury stock Committee of board
of board of directors. annually. of directors.
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